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by police. In view of these considerations, it is difficult to sug-
gest another expedient that would protect the rights of the ac-
cused as does the presence of counsel.
Concluding that the presence of an attorney is necessary pre-
sents the authorities with immense practical difficulties. No
machinery exists for the appointment of counsel when required
by Miranda; if such machinery were devised, great hardship
would be placed on the bar in working it. Perhaps a public de-
fender system or the presence of a committing magistrate dur-
ing questioning might be the answer. However, since no attor-
ney-client relationship would exist between the accused and the
magistrate, that system may be deemed unsatisfactory by the
court. When an attorney is present, if he is to fulfill the tra-
ditional role of advocate of his client's interests, it seems he will
advise the accused to remain silent; thus the number of confes-
sions procured will be substantially reduced.
These problems do not lend themselves to an easy solution, in
fact the different situations existing in city and country par-
ishes and even between city and city will probably require dif-
ferent procedures. A truly workable solution in each instance
can only be had after thorough and careful consideration by the
law enforcement authorities, the bar and the courts.
Thomas R. Blum
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCOPE OF CONGRESS' AUTHORITY To
LEGISLATE IN AID OF THE FOURTEENTH AND
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The United States sought injunctive relief in federal district
court against individual property owners of West Feliciana Par-
ish for allegedly violating section 11(b) of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act' by their individual acts 2 of discrimination against
Negro citizens who had registered to vote. In refusing the in-
junction, the court held section 11 (b) of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act unconstitutional in that it purports to penalize purely indi-
vidual acts which interfere with a person's right to vote in state
1. Section 11 (b) of Public Law 89-110, 89th Congress, commonly known as
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides: "No person, whether acting under color
of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimi-
date, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimi-
date, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
person for urging or aiding any person to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce
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or local elections.3 United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219
(E.D. La. 1966).
The Supreme Court held in The Civil Rights Cases4 that the
fourteenth amendment5 does not compel a private citizen to
refrain from discrimination, but that it is aimed solely at state
discrimination. The Court added that the grant of legislative
power of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not extend
to general legislation, but rather is restricted to corrective legis-
lation aimed at counteracting state laws and practices that con-
travene the prohibitions of the amendment. The Supreme Court
throughout the years has consistently applied this traditional
doctrine requiring state action and allowing only corrective leg-
islation.6 Congress has thus specifically been denied authority
to penalize private citizens for individual acts of discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment.
The earliest circuit court decisions7 reviewing statutes8
any person for exercising any powers or duties under Section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10,
or 12(e)."
2. The alleged acts of discrimination were: (a) The termination of share-
cropping and tenant farming relationships with Negro registrants; (b) the evic-
tion of Negro registrants from homes held under rental agreements; (c) the re-
lease of Negro registrants from salaried or otherwise remunerative positions
held on the farms; (d) the imposing of rents on houses which were formerly
occupied in connection with sharecropping agreements.
3. The court went on to add in the alternative that if this holding is incorrect,
plaintiff's injunctive relief must still be denied on the grounds that to construe
and apply section 11(b) as plaintiff advocated would deny defendants due process
of law and that the evidence adduced at the trial was insufficient to prove the
alleged violations of 11(b) by a preponderance of the evidence. Pretermitting
the alternative holdings, this Note will be primarily concerned with the holding
declaring that section 11(b) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional
when applied to individual action.
4. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
"Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article."
6. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ; United States v. Wil-
liams, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 721-25 (1961).
7. United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324, 1325-26 (No. 15,210) (C.C.1).
Del. 1873) ; United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81-82 (No. 15,282) (C.C.S.D.
Ala. 1871) ; United States v. Crosby, 25 Fed. Cas. 701 (No. 14,893) (C.C.D.S.C.
1871).
8. Popularly known as the Enforcement Act, the Force Act, and the Ku Klux
Act, the statutes were: Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Feb. 28. 1871,
16 Stat. 933; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
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passed under the authority of the fifteenth amendment stand
for the proposition that Congress had implied authority to pro-
tect fifteenth amendment rights against private individual ac-
tion. A later circuit court decision1" by Justice Bradley sitting
as a Circuit Judge held Congress could protect equal access to
the franchise under authority of the fifteenth amendment even
against private interference. In United States v. Reese," the
Supreme Court held the fifteenth amendment invested citizens
with a new constitutional right, an exemption from discrimina-
tion in the exercise of the franchise on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. The opinion went on to state
that by inference this right is an attribute of national citizen-
ship and could, therefore, be protected from private interfer-
ence. In Ex parte Yarbrough,12 the Supreme Court seemingly
applied the fifteenth amendment to private interference with
the right to vote. However, Yarbrough is presently considered
to stand only for the proposition that the right of all citizens
to vote in federal elections can be protected from private inter-
ference. 13
The argument has been advanced that judicial decisions at
the beginning of the twentieth century reflect a change in the
mood of the nation from apathy to sympathy for the position of
the southern white, 4 with Reconstruction generally viewed as
a futile experiment, part sinister, part naive. 15 Be that as it
may, the Supreme Court in 1903 decided in James v. Bowman16
that the fifteenth amendment prohibits only action by the United
States or any state, and does not proscribe wrongful individual
acts. In effect the Court adopted for the fifteenth amendment
the traditional state action requirement enunciated in The Civil
Rights Cases for the fourteenth amendment. Decisions following
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."
"Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation."
10. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. 707 (No. 14,897) (C.C.D. La.
1874).
11. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
12, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
13, See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951) United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
14. 74 YALE L.J. 1448, 1454 (1965).
15. Woodward, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SoUiTH 324-25 (1951); WooDwARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF Jim CROW 52-53 (1955).
16. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
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James v. Bowman have consistently held that state action is a
necessary requirement under the fifteenth amendment.1 7
To this point state action is necessary under both the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments. Therefore, it seems logical
that United States v. Harvey declaring section 11 (b) of the 1965
Voting Rights Act unconstitutional was correct under estab-
lished law18 since Congress, assuming its authority 9 under the
enforcement clause of the fifteenth amendment, purported to
penalize purely individual action as well as state action in sec-
tion 11 (b).
However, two recent decisions have created doubt whether
the Supreme Court would declare section 11 (b) of the 1965 Vot-
ing Rights Act unconstitutional as it applies to individual ac-
tion. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,20 the Supreme Court with seven
members in the majority held section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act 2' was a proper exercise of the powers granted Con-
17. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
18. In holding section 11(b) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act unconstitutional,
the federal district court relied squarely on James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903), a Supreme Court decision which declared U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5507 uncon-
stitutional. Section 5507, which contained language very similar to section 11(b)
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, provided: "Every person who prevents, hinders,
controls, or intimidates another from exercising, or in exercising the right of
suffrage, to whom that right is guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, by means of bribery or threats of depriving
such person of employment or occupation, or of ejecting such person from a
rented house, lands, or other property, or by threats of refusing to renew leases
or contracts of labor, or 'by threats of violence to himself or family, shall be pun-
ished as provided in the preceding section." The Supreme Court, in James v.
Bowman, stated, "[T]he Fifteenth Amendment relates solely to action by the
United States or by any state and does not contemplate wrongful individual acts."
The Court went on to hold "that a statute which purports to punish purely
individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power
conferred by the 15th amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state
through some one or more of its official representatives."
19. The very title of the 1965 Voting Rights Act leaves no doubt that the act
was enacted 'by Congress under an assumption that its authority to do so was
contained in the fifteenth amendment. The act is entitled "To Enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other
Purposes." In addition, the act shows by its repeated reference to the fifteenth
amendment that the amendment is considered to be the source of congressional
power to enact this legislation. It is repeatedly stated that its purpose is "to
enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment."
20. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
21. Section 4(e) provides that no person who has successfully completed
the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was
other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of
his inability to read or write English.
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gress by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 22 and that by
the force of the Supremacy Clause 23 a New York English-lit-
eracy requirement could not be enforced to the extent it was in-
consistent with section 4(e). The Supreme Court did not find
that the New York English-literacy voting requirement violated
the Constitution and carefully refused to overrule Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Board,24 which held that a North Caro-
lina English-literacy voting requirement did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus the
Supreme Court permitted Congress to strike down a state law
without finding that it violated the Constitution. The decision
was based on the view that section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Con-
gress to exercise its discretion in determining what legislation
is necessary and proper to secure the guarantees of the amend-
ment. The scope of this discretion seems to be similar to the
discretion Congress enjoys under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the Constitution. 25 Justice Harlan dissented on the
ground that it is first necessary to find a state violation of the
fourteenth amendment before Congress can enact legislation
striking down state laws.
In United States v. Guest,26 the Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal of charges against six defendants for conspiring to
violate a citizen's rights under the Constitution or federal law
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241.27 Justice Stewart, delivering
the opinion of the court, found state action and restated the
traditional view that rights under the fourteenth amendment
arise only if there has been action by the state, or one acting
under the color of its authority, in violation of that amendment.
Two concurring opinions indicate that a majority of the Court
while agreeing with the disposition of the case disagree with
Justice Stewart as to the necessity of state action violating the
22. The Court stated that section 2 of the fifteenth amendment grants Con-
gress a similar power to enforce by "appropriate legislation" the provisions of
that amendment.
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
24. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For the classic formulation of the reach
of those two powers, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579,
605 (1819).
26. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
27. This section provides in part: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or 'because of his having so exercised the same, . . . . They shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
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amendment before Congress is competent to legislate in support
of it. Justice Clark, with whom Justices Black and Fortas joined,
stated, ".... the specific language of section 5 empowers the Con-
gress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies - with or with-
out state action - that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights." Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion, in which
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined, argued that 18
U.S.C. § 241 reaches a private conspiracy not because the four-
teenth amendment itself prohibits such a conspiracy, but be-
cause 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a valid exercise of congressional legisla-
tive authority pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justice Brennan acknowledged the traditional doctrine
under which Congress' authority to legislate in support of the
fourteenth amendment is confined to corrective legislation to
counteract state laws and acts that violate the amendment's
guarantees, but he noted that he and a majority of the Court
reject the traditional interpretation in favor of the view that
section 5 authorizes Congress to enact all laws reasonably nec-
assary and proper to protect rights created by and arising under
the fourteenth amendment.
Morgan and Guest indicate that the Supreme Court has sub-
stantially expanded the scope of congressional legislative author-
ity under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Two limita-
tions seem to have been removed. First, Congress is no longer
limited to enacting corrective legislation but may legislate in
support of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments whenever
it deems the legislation reasonably necessary to secure the civil
and political rights protected by the amendments. The condi-
tion on this power is that there must be a reasonable relation
between the legislation and the protections of the amendments.
Second, it seems that state action is no longer a limitation on
congressional legislative authority and Congress may now pe-
nalize individuals as well as states when enacting laws in sup-
port of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Thus, the
Supreme Court has greatly broadened the scope of congressional
legislative authority under these amendments, which apparently
will be read as "authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion
in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for
all citizens." 28
James Fleet Howell
28. Quotation from Brennan, concurring, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 784 (1966).
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